I f love is a social as well as a personal reality, it could be fruitful to compare von Hildebrand's understanding o f love and desire with that o f cultural anthropologist Rene Girard. Girard depicts love and desire as a triangular process which arises from imita tion, rather than the result o f auto-generative affection. In this sense, Girardian theory would seem to convict von Hildebrand o f what is called the "romantic lie" wherein desire is thought to arise through the mutual appreciation o f two subjects. However, in The Nature o f Love von Hildebrand shows awareness o f the possibility that love can be awakened by imitation. Moreover, the lack o f a sufficient reason in Girardian theory for avoiding vio lence can be answered by turning to von Hildebrand's apprecia tion o f the ontological basis for desire.
I f the notion o f love is central to communal living, whether in its differing degrees for friends, neighbors or spouses, then Dietrich von Hildebrand's The Nature o f Love cannot but be relevant to reflection on the structure and dynamics o f the social sphere, and o f human culture in general.1 The value responses o f every individual, which inform von Hildebrand's understanding o f love and o f ethics in general, are educed within a community also shaped by values, goods and social relations. As von Hildebrand observed in an early work, the community too has its own metaphysics.
We can wonder what correlations, or indeed tensions, can be iden tified between von Hildebrand's view o f love, and love as framed by the anthropological and cultural theories o f Rene Girard. Girard, a now-retired 1 Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, trans. John F. Crosby with John Henry Crosby (South Bend: St. Augustine 's Press, 2009 ). * professor who taught at Stanford University for many years, established his reputation on the back o f the following three major theories: first, the imi tative or mimetic origin o f human desire; second, the universal tendency o f human societies to purge themselves o f desire-driven conflict through the process o f scapegoating; and third, the unique character o f Christianity, which parodies the scapegoating process in the Crucifixion, but yet resolves conflicts through non-retaliation, forgiveness, and renunciation. I f we con sider that Girard places love at the heart o f this last theory, the interest in fa cilitating a Hildebrand-Girard encounter becomes more tangible. O f course, we are dealing with two bodies o f thought that express quite different in tellectual perspectives and convictions and since no critical work has been conducted so far in this area, this paper is itself entirely exploratory. Still, so influential have these thinkers been in reflecting on " the human" that some comparison is quite in order and potentially fruitful for Hildebrandians and Girardians alike.
In confronting Girard's thought with that o f von Hildebrand, we could consider a range o f concerns, but this investigation will focus on just two. First, we ask to what extent von Hildebrand's description o f love falls afoul o f Girard's criticism o f desire as auto-generative, or originating in the subject. If, as Girard believes, an object's desirability is grasped only through our perception o f others' desires, what becomes o f the "I-Thou" axis which is so central to von Hildebrand's understanding o f love? Second, we can ask whether Girard's insistence on the avoidance o f violence relies on a volunta rist reading o f action; a reading which, unlike von Hildebrand's, neglects the metaphysical plane almost entirely. Hildebrandians and Girardians are under standably protective o f their masters' legacies, but in this writer's opinion, this is an even greater reason to subject such legacies to robust and fearless discussion. Von Hildebrand and Girard surely deserve nothing less.
D esire and Love: von H ild ebran d 's A cknow ledgem ent o f Im itation
Girard's initial achievement in the realm o f cultural studies was to develop a theory o f literature which sought to attack what he called the " mensonge romantique'-the " romantic lie." The romantic tradition interpreted desire and love as the fruit o f a binary encounter between choosing-subject and chosen-ob ject. The themes o f romantic desire evoke the supremacy o f personal choice, the power o f the subject's desire, the embodiment o f that desire through passion, and a restricted focus on the individual's agency. Nineteenth-century questioning o f this tradition is usually located in the emergence o f literary naturalism and realism which sought to objectify experiences related through literature. In the work o f novelists such as Emile Zola, for example, theories o f heredity called into question whether the individual, his inclinations and his choices, could ever be free from the physiological and psychological influ ences o f his forbearers; desire for Zola was not so much the exercise o f the individual's free subjectivity as the moral fallout o f his psychological, physi ological, and environmental conditions. Subsequent theories o f psychology, such as that o f Sigmund Freud's, likewise questioned the somewhat simplistic model o f an all-conscious self whose desires were literally monarchical-ruled by the authentic " one." In other words, by the time Girard came to question the romantic lie in his first book, Mensonge romantique et verite romanesque, it had already been well tested by artists and theorists, even if it lived on-and continues to live on today-in popular culture.2
Girard's questioning o f the romantic lie took, however, a distinctive shape. In studying a number o f major European novelists, notably Stendhal, Dostoyevsky, and Proust, he remarked that at a certain point their works began to portray desire not as a binary process but as the result o f imita tion. For Girard, desire is to be distinguished from appetite or need, both o f which are binary. (We can note here in passing the correlation between Girard's thought and that o f von Hildebrand's, which carefully distinguishes between the biological and instrumentalist purposes o f sensible or utilitarian goods, as opposed to things that represent a value in themselves.) Now, since biological need and instrumentalism can be found in the animal kingdom, desire is a peculiarly human phenomenon, according to Girard. And yet, he observes, desire (as opposed to need or appetite) seems to be aroused not by the direct perception o f something as a value or good, but by the perception that something is desirable because it is the object o f another's desire. In any given situation, another's desire for some object, value, or person unveils to me its very desirability. Girardian desire, therefore, is not a binary encounter between choosing subject and chosen object, but a triangular process-G i rard even calls it " le desir triangulaire" -in which the subject imitates a model's desire and in which desirability is thus mediated rather than immediate. Now, imitation has o f course long been recognized as an essential aspect o f human education: anima quaedamodum omnia, as the Scholastics used to say. Girard's originality, however, lies in identifying how a certain canon o f authors-those who produce what he calls " verite romanesque" or "novelistic truth"-have depicted imitation or modeling as an essential process within the generation o f human desire and choice. Such imitation can be mediated through a living person with whom the subject can potentially come into conflict, but it can also, as in the case o f D on Quixote, be the result o f read ing or some other cultural experience. As children we learn through imitation what is desirable-witness the dispute between two children over one toy when the nursery is packed with toys-but, according to Girard, even our adult desires tend to follow this triangular dynamic. As a corollary o f this triangulation, and in later works such as L a Violence et le Saere, Girard would come to regard as mythological all cultural narratives which portray desire as a binary encounter between choosing-subject and chosen-object.3 Cultural narratives become mythological insofar as they veil the mediated or imitative processes which engender desire, hide the source o f conflict which arises from our wanting what our neighbor wants, and veil its violent resolution.
If, for the time being, we allow Girard's theory to stand, it is clear that it poses problems for a Hildebrandian view o f love which is rooted in value-response. Von Hildebrand does not o f course consider love as a cat egory o f desire, but love must necessarily involve the moral process which encompasses the freely chosen association o f lover and beloved. Indeed, many o f von Hildebrand's descriptions and distinctions appear to indicate that in his view both desire and love are not mediated but binary in character. For example, love arises when the other person's being and existence become fully thematic for the subject and elicit a person-focused value response. In Chapter 1 o f The Nature o f Love, von Hildebrand argues that love involves a perception o f the overall beauty and preciousness o f a person, even if those value qualities surpass our value concepts.4 For von Hildebrand, the patholo gies o f love concern mostly its confusion with needs and appetites, rather than the conflicts which can arise from triangulated desire. We find the same binary understanding o f love and desire in Chapter 6 o f The Nature o f Love which studies the intentio unionis. Here the binary character o f love is rein forced as a reciprocal and mutual value response. There is an interpenetration o f looks between the lovers who participate in, and enrich, each others' hap piness; there is a reciprocal self-donation which, at the same time, does not annihilate but rather reinforces the self as person.5 Thus von Hildebrand's description o f love, from initiation to fulfillment, sits apparently within the tradition which understands desire as a binary process o f choosing subject and chosen object. That von Hildebrand defends the right o f the beloved not to be objectified or instrumentalized is arguably tangential to von Hil debrand's binary understanding o f desire. The beloved is still ontologically the direct object o f the lover's value response, regardless o f how much their mutual value responses become perfected in the intentio unionis, with all that it represents. I f we look at von Hildebrand's analysis in light o f the Girardian theory o f desire, should we conclude that von Hildebrand's description and analysis o f love are guilty o f the romantic lie? As we have shown above, by romantic lie Girard does not mean the selfishness, instrumentalization, or objectification to which lovers are subjected by pathological versions o f love (and all o f which von Hildebrand is more than well aware of), but rather Girard has in mind a model o f love which does not acknowledge or disclose the imitative character o f desire; a model o f love which elides the process by which value comes to be perceived as desirable.
Such a conclusion would, however, be precipitous and tendentious. We should, in fact, refrain from accusing von Hildebrand o f the romantic lie for two reasons: First, in the introduction to The Nature o f Love von Hilde brand does in fact acknowledge a certain form o f mimesis or imitation in the moral life:
Virtues are in fact primarily given to us in other persons. What humility is can only be grasped in another person; kindness is primarily given to us in others.... For our purposes the important thing is to see that the essence o f love is not only given to us when we ourselves love; it is also given to us immediately and primordially in the love o f others__How often has someone who was never in love been awakened to such a love by the spousal love o f another person for him.6 Von Hildebrand's insistence on imitation (observe in the Crosby translation the use o f adverbs such as 'primarily' and 'primordially') is more honored in the breach than in the observance in the development o f von Hildebrand's subsequent analysis, but its importance is clearly acknowledged in the above cited passage. The vital difference between Girard and von Hildebrand on this point is that Girard tends to make all desire dependent on imitation, while von Hildebrand acknowledges this imitative process in describing the initial genesis o f some value response.
Von Hildebrand and Girard thus share the observation that love and desire are potencies actualized from without. For neither theorist can desire be merely auto-generative; and for von Hildebrand the binary pro cess o f love appears ("how often," he says) to find its psychological roots in the moral awakening provided mimetically by encountering values in others. Some might advance the objection that here von Hildebrand is only evoking imitation as a purely epistemological phenomenon, such that we can learn what is desirable in a general sense through imitation (which procures for us Ibid., 11-12.
intellectual insight) but that our desire in any particular and concrete case is not thus conditioned. Such an objection, however, would fail to account for the process o f love having been " awakened"-surely descriptive o f an actual moral affection-to which von Hildebrand alludes. The argument is not that von Hildebrand thinks all desire is generated mimetically but rather that he concedes the possibility that it can be. When interpreting the Hildebrandian " I-Thou" axis one would do well to be aware o f this possibility. To argue the point p er absurdum: denying that von Hildebrand concedes the possibility o f desire through imitation would lead us to assume that he holds envy or jeal ousy to be impossible!
Why Avoid Violence? G irard's Need for O ntology
The second reason for exonerating von Hildebrand from the accusation o f the romantic lies in a logical problem inherent in Girard's theory: if all desire is imitative or mediated, then we have a perpetual chain o f learned desire (which is neither need nor appetite) going back ad infinitum. In other words, how has anyone ever desired anything in the first place without someone from whom they could learn the desirability o f what they would then come to desire? This is not to say that the process o f mimesis identified by Girard should not retain its recently acquired foothold in the analysis o f culture. Still, this question indicates one o f the fundamental problems with Girard's thought: that in making all desirability the result o f human acculturation-o f our learning from others what is desirable-it subtly renders occult the exis tence o f a transcendent and ontological good or value to which our wills are ordered intrinsically.
In order to unpack the consequences o f this problem it is useful to dwell for a few moments on the problem o f objectification and consider the differences between von Hildebrand's and Girard's criticism o f it; for, in this difference lies an illustration o f Girard's weakness and the potential useful ness o f an application o f von Hildebrand's ethics to Girard's anthropology.
According to chapters two and three o f The Nature o f Love, objecti fication is said to arise when the value response to a person has been substi tuted by the drive to satisfy a need. What is thematic is no longer the person encountered, but the satisfaction o f some desire within the desiring subject. It is important to distinguish here between von Hildebrand's use o f the word 'desire,' which is always associated with appetitus, and Girard's use o f the word 'desire' which means either (a) a legitimate longing acquired through imitation or (b) a longing which vies with another for the object that both desire. For example, according to von Hildebrand, objectification leads the legendary figure o f D on Juan to forget the themacity o f his beloved, to focus instead on the satisfaction o f his desire. According to Girard, in contrast, objectification leads the subject to forget the nature o f what he (perhaps) legitimately desires, and to turn his attention to any rival who threatens his possession or enjoyment o f it. While for von Hildebrand objectification results from the themacity o f self-satisfaction in the subject's perception, for Girard objectification arises when the rivalry between subject and model becomes thematic, relegating the object to being merely an instrument o f their rivalry. In Chapter 6 o f The Nature o f Love, von Hildebrand observes that even the intentio unionis can become vitiated by possessiveness and selfishness. For Girard, on the other hand, the vitiation o f desire lies always in rivalry, in the conflict it produces, and eventually in the outbreak o f violence. At this point, says Girard, the ri vals forget about the object they are fighting over and focus all their energies on their rivalry, while at the same time the logic o f imitation turns them into monstrous doubles o f each other.7
Thus far, both critiques o f objectification express vitiations o f hu man conduct, be that through self-centered substitution o f desire for value response, or in the turning o f desire into a pretext for conflict. Still, the prob lem with Girard's theory becomes all the clearer in his justification for turning away from mimetic rivalry. Girard's second book, L a Violence et le Saccre, was an immense study o f primitive religion and o f the mechanism o f the sacrificial scapegoat which it theorized as a universally attested means o f purging com munities o f latent violence (violence being the result o f rivalry induced by mimetic desire). Subsequently, however, in his Des Choses cachees depuis la fondation du monde, Girard identified in Christianity a different way o f dealing with violence.8 In the Crucifixion, says Girard, Christianity parodies the sacrificial scapegoat mechanism o f purgation in other religions, but short-circuits its logic by seeing in this act the refusal o f G od to retaliate for his Son's death. According to Girard, this non-violence on the part o f G od makes Christian ity unique, for through it Christ lived out the very fullness (" /a plenitude ') o f love. Arguably, however, this was not the only error in Des Choses cachees. For not only did this work misinterpret the concept o f Christ's sacrifice, but entirely failed to provide a sufficient reason to avoid violence in the first place (by violence, let us understand here not only force but all self-interested manipulation o f circumstances, whether by physical, psychological or com municative means). In The City o f God, St. Augustine claims that all men want peace, and that those who fight are only looking for the peace that comes after fighting. But is this really true? On the contrary, people are violent be cause it procures for them the things that they desire. People are violent because on a physiological and psychological level they enjoy the adrenalin rush which violence and power bring. Neither o f these benefits are available to those who renounce violence. Girard's theories warn us admirably against violence, but do not tell us why we should not take the world by force.
Here is where von Hildebrand's ethics can arguably come to the res cue. For Girard, violence is something principally that we do to each other. For von Hildebrand, violence is no doubt something that we can do to each other, but it is also something that can be done to objects, goods, or values by our failure to recognize them for what they are or to treat them with due dignity. In von Hildebrand's concept o f value response, we find not only an explicit ethic o f conduct (which is what Girard's advocacy o f non-violence depends on) but an ontological theory which looks to the being o f things in their true character and which illumines our moral reaction to them. Con duct, after all, is not merely about the avoidance o f evil-as Girard inadver tently implies-but about the pursuit o f the good. Girard has perhaps been so preoccupied with the mechanism, or the how, o f desire that he has not found room in his doctrine for the what o f desire. In von Hildebrand's value response, however, we find not only a guide to conduct (" avoid violence through restraint") but an acknowledgement o f its ontological roots. We can extrapolate, moreover, from such ontological insights the reason why peace is not merely the absence o f violence, but the recognition and appreciation o f some order o f being, the highest o f which elicits love from the lower orders. We can conclude that without understanding the very violence which desire can inflict on the order o f being (whether through objectification or instrumentalization), no sufficient reason can be given for rejecting violence in the first place.
I f we ask why Girard's theories fail in this regard, the answer might lie in the fact that anthropology is primarily a discipline o f observation. stract for any anthropology to contemplate. In coming to this conclusion we must not ignore for a moment the threat that evoking the specter o f essentialism poses to a large section o f the academy. And yet naming and identifying things-escaping from a logic which was first mooted in nominal ism-might ultimately be the only sufficient reason not to succumb to the attractions o f violence and power.
In any case, the moral corollaries which Girard undoubtedly draws from his anthropological account o f Christianity are on uncertain ground without some ontological anchor that explains not only the value o f the non violence o f love, but why that non-violence is proportionate to the goods, values, and ultimately, the persons which we learn to desire by mimetic be havior. I f von Hildebrand's concept o f value response can supply for this lacuna, it will not be the least o f its achievements.
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